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Juliette CADIOT, Le laboratoire impérial. Russie-URSS 1870-1940. Paris : CNRS Éditions,
2007, 266 p.
1 Who says that the census is dull business?  In 1897 in a village in Kazan province, a group
of irate Muslim Tatars stormed into a meeting of census takers, told the priest in the
room to go perform an unmentionable act with his mother, and proceeded to smash up a
portrait  of  the tsar,  including “the crown, globe,  and scepter mounted on top of the
frame” (p. 48).  In this case, the uproar was sparked by the Tatars’ fears that the census
takers had come to convert them to Orthodoxy.  But troubles accompanied the census
almost everywhere in the Russian Empire.  To advance its agenda in a statistical age, the
government needed a full count of the population.  But local people – Russians and non-
Russians  alike –  saw the  census  as  a  nuisance  or  a  threat  and  tended  to  be  deeply
suspicious. 
2 Juliette Cadiot’s book is a thought-provoking study of the politics of counting and being
counted in Russia from the 1870s to the eve of World War II.  Historians like Ian Hacking
have shown how modern biometrics emerged as a key arena of state activity in Europe
and North America in the early 1800s.   Cadiot’s book focuses on the next stage – the
momentous period when population politics became an international tool of government.
 As  she  makes  clear,  Russia  was  a  full  participant  in  this  global  trend.   The country
embraced population politics with gusto, and the fixation with population carried over
the revolutionary divide.  Indeed, one of Cadiot’s basic arguments is that the late imperial
and early Soviet regimes shared much in common as modernizing states.  Despite their
own ideological  reservations,  both governments  were drawn to  the new potential  of
identifying and reorganizing national groups as a means of “managing” diversity.  Both
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likewise devised ways to justify using nationality as a tool for murder and deportation.  As
Cadiot sees it, the late imperial decades – in particular, the crisis years of the Great War –
were the hothouse that produced most of the dramatic national/imperial innovations of
the Soviet age.  The new revolutionary order was created by the old reactionary one.
3 At the heart of this story of imperial continuum are the “nationality specialists” – the
ethnographers, statisticians, and demographers who devised the concepts and supplied
the  numbers.   Cadiot  presents  us  their  experience  in  a  series  of  tightly  organized,
chronological  chapters.   In  the  1870s,  we  see  them  draw  up  the  first  rigorous
ethnographic maps of the empire and defend statistics as the “objective measure” that
will resolve the national tensions of the day.  They work out the great imperial census of
1897.  They establish ethnography as a discipline.  During World War I, a key period of
transition, they further “operationalize” nationality by putting their expertise to serve
the cause of the war.  They help the government to devise a new hierarchy of “loyal” and
“unreliable” subjects based on national criteria.  Poles, Jews, and Russian Germans are
singled out as especially untrustworthy.   The consequences for the members of these
groups are murderous. 
4 Then comes the revolution, and, by and large, as Cadiot shows us, the experts sign on
with the new regime.  Some do this because they are true believers, others because they
believe in the higher cause of serving “the continuity of the state.”  Once on board, they
become key players in the “blossoming of national identities” in the 1920s.  They add and
subtract  peoples  from  ever  shifting  lists  of  “Soviet  nationalities.”   They  “Sovietize”
ethnography.  By the 1930s, however, with the rise in state repression and increasing
anxieties about the vulnerability of the homeland, their influence begins to wane.  Cadiot
concludes her book with the census of 1939, which announces at once the “resolution” of
the “nationality question” in the USSR and the experts’ own obsolescence.  Having done
their  job  to  perfection,  it  seems,  the  “nationality  specialists”  put  themselves  out  of
business.
5 The broad outlines of Cadiot’s story are relatively familiar.  Yuri Slezkine, Terry Martin,
and  especially  Francine  Hirsch  have  explored  the  work  of  late  imperial  and  Soviet
ethnographers and nationality planners.  Peter Holquist, Eric Lohr, Joshua Sanborn, and
Mark Von Hagen (among others) have identified the crucial importance of the Great War
in establishing nationality as a new factor in Russian population politics.  But Cadiot’s
work  makes  a  number  of  valuable  and  original  contributions  in  its  own  right.   I
particularly liked the detail she brings to the problem of “nationality science,” which she
examines not only as an evolving set of practices in late tsarist/Soviet administration but
also as a mental construct of Russian intellectuals.  Cadiot is especially good at making us
see how the zeal of late tsarist experts flowed into the nation-building experiments of the
early Soviet years.   
6 Her book also reveals the full messiness of the work on the “nationalities question.”  The
vignette of the angry Tatars in Kazan is one of many examples of official practices and
scientific categories butting up against real life.  She reminds us that some of the experts
she studies also had great reservations about the way their knowledge would eventually
be used.  She explicitly rejects the argument that scholars were the tame servants of the
state.  One of the book’s recurring motifs is the experts’ interest in holding onto and
defining “their own way of thinking about social phenomena” (p. 210).
7 At the same time, Cadiot seems well aware that she is offering us a view of a slow-moving
car wreck that will eventually have horrendous consequences.  Some experts may indeed
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have  worried  about  and  resisted  the  way  that  state  power  would  appropriate  their
insights.  Yet many others were proud enablers of the process.  To make sense of this
complicated situation, Cadiot argues we should take into account the deep influence of
European  colonialism on  the  morphology  of  Russian  social  science.   Russian  experts
worked within a colonial world.  They engaged with the colonial practices and prejudices
of their time, adapting them first to the particulars of the Russian Empire and then, after
the revolution, to the idiosyncrasies of Bolshevik ideology.   In other words, she seems to
be saying, there was no Sonderweg in the Russian imperial experience.   The tsars and
commissars, for better and for worse, were very much in step with the world around
them.  Some of the book’s most interesting passages are those that show us Russian and
Soviet experts borrowing from and reacting to an international field of concerns about
nationality.
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